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ZIGLAR V. ABBASI AND THE 
DEMISE OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
Jules Lobel* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the recent decision Ziglar v. Abbasi,1 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected 
constitutional claims brought by Muslim aliens who were detained—
allegedly in cruel and harsh conditions, and because of their race, religion, or 
national origin—in the United States after the attacks of September 11, 
2001.2  Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the four-to-two majority held that the 
plaintiffs, even assuming that all of their allegations were true, had no 
damages remedy against the high-level Bush administration officials who 
authorized the allegedly unconstitutional government policies.3  The Ziglar 
decision has been criticized as potentially gutting the Bivens4 cause of action, 
which allows individuals harmed by federal officials’ violations of 
constitutional rights—such as those under the Fourth5 and Eighth6 
Amendments—to sue for damages in federal court.7  Justice Breyer pointed 
out in his dissent: 
 
*  Bessie McKee Walthour Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School.  This 
Article was prepared for the Colloquium entitled Access to Justice and the Legal Profession 
in an Era of Contracting Civil Liability, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein 
Center for Law and Ethics on October 27, 2017, at Fordham University School of Law.   
 
 1. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
 2. Id. at 1853–54. 
 3. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan recused themselves, and Justice Gorsuch did not 
participate in the case, leaving only six Justices to hear the case. Id. at 1851. 
 4. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1999). 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 7. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395–98; see also Leading Case, Ziglar v. Abbasi, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. 313, 317–18 (2017) (arguing that, by distinguishing Bivens and the two Supreme Court 
cases that recognized a Bivens cause of action, and by making it difficult for any case that does 
not present the Bivens facts to survive, Ziglar and its forebears have relegated Bivens and its 
progeny to “mere ghosts of their former selves, barely clinging to existence” (quoting 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 199 (1956))); Michael C. Dorf, SCOTUS Severely 
Narrows Civil Rights Suits Against Federal Officers, DORF ON L. (June 19, 2017, 12:44 PM), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/06/scotus-severely-narrows-civil-rights.html 
[https://perma.cc/S6JZ-3MAR] (stating that Ziglar “makes it all but impossible for civil rights 
plaintiffs to sue federal officials for money damages”); Garrett Epps, The Supreme Court’s 
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Given the[] safeguards against undue interference by the Judiciary in times 
of war or national-security emergency, the Court’s abolition, or limitation 
of, Bivens actions goes too far.  If you are cold, put on a sweater, perhaps 
an overcoat, perhaps also turn up the heat, but do not set fire to the house.8 
This Article will focus on one important aspect of the Ziglar opinion:  its 
attempt to distinguish injunctive relief from damages actions.  Ziglar’s 
attempt to distinguish injunctive relief from a damages remedy was central 
to its decision because, at first glance, Ziglar seems in considerable tension 
with the Court’s decision almost ten years earlier in Boumediene v. Bush.9  In 
Boumediene, the court held that alien detainees at Guantanamo Bay had a 
constitutional right to habeas corpus to challenge their detentions.10  The 
Court took an insistent role in Boumediene and a number of other War on 
Terror cases in asserting jurisdiction over claims challenging the Bush 
administration’s national security policies.11  By contrast, the Ziglar Court 
was extremely deferential to executive officials’ claims that even hearing 
plaintiffs’ claims on the merits could harm national security.12 
Justice Kennedy, who wrote both the Boumediene and Ziglar opinions, 
suggested that the difference might lie in the differing remedies sought in 
each case.13  This Article challenges that assumption and compares Ziglar 
with two other important national security cases decided almost two centuries 
apart.14  It illustrates that the differing remedies in Boumediene and Ziglar—
injunctive relief and damages, respectively—do not explain the differing 
results in those cases.  Rather, the Court and the other political branches have 
seemingly reached the conclusion that executive officials who violate the 
Constitution in times of war or national emergency should not be held 
 
Ominous National Security Ruling, ATLANTIC (June 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2017/06/the-supreme-courts-ominous-national-security-ruling/530886/ 
[https://perma.cc/U6U3-RQPV] (stating that “the lurking issue [in Ziglar] is whether a court 
should second-guess any administration if plaintiffs seek ‘an inquiry into sensitive issues of 
national security [that are] the prerogative of the Congress and President’” (second alteration 
in original) (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1861)); Shirin Sinnar, The Ziglar v. Abbasi Decision:  
Unsurprising and Devastating, LEGAL AGGREGATE (June 20, 2017), https://law.stanford.edu/ 
2017/06/20/the-ziglar-v-abbasi-decision-unsurprising-and-devastating/ [https://perma.cc/ 
7TUU-RX32] (“The unsurprising nature of [Ziglar], however, shouldn’t detract from its 
significance:  for certain kinds of constitutional violations, it throttles attempts to hold federal 
officials accountable.  For the victims of human rights violations left without a legal remedy, 
it’s devastating.”); Steve Vladeck, On Justice Kennedy’s Flawed and Depressing Narrowing 
of Constitutional Damages Remedies, JUST SECURITY (June 19, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/42334/justice-kennedys-flawed-depressing-narrowing-
constitutional-damages-remedies/ [https://perma.cc/QKD7-ZYTN] (stating Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion in Ziglar “will make it much harder, going forward, for almost any plaintiff to obtain 
relief for constitutional violations that have ceased, even though constitutional rights aren’t 
worth that much if they can’t be enforced”). 
 8. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1884 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 9. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 10. Id. at 771. 
 11. See, e.g., id.; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533, 539 (2004). 
 12. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1861. 
 13. Id. at 1863–65. 
 14. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 
(1804). 
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individually accountable for their actions, a conclusion at odds with early 
Supreme Court decisions and the views of prominent early leaders of our 
government.15  The most dangerous aspect of the Court’s opinion in Ziglar 
is not its near evisceration of the Bivens remedy but rather its view that high-
level government officials should not be held accountable for 
unconstitutional decisions made in periods of war or national emergency.16 
Part I of this Article discusses Ziglar in light of the Court’s other cases 
challenging aspects of the executive’s conduct in the struggle against 
terrorism.  Part II compares Ziglar with other case law that suggests that the 
Ziglar Court’s focus on the potential availability of injunctive relief is not of 
central importance to its dismissal of the Bivens claims.  This Article 
continues in Part III with a historical discussion of official accountability for 
unconstitutional conduct during times of national crisis or exigency and early 
leaders’ views regarding such official accountability, and provides instances 
where unconstitutional official conduct was met with damages liability.  
Finally, this Article concludes that Ziglar is at odds with the basic precepts 
of the framers’ view of the judicial role in addressing official claims of 
necessity during times of national emergency or serious crisis. 
I.  ZIGLAR AND BOUMEDIENE 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ziglar focused on “special factors 
necessarily implicated by [plaintiffs’] detention policy claims,” which 
counseled against permitting a Bivens action to proceed.17  For one, the 
claims “call[ed] into question the formulation and implementation of a 
general policy” and challenged “major elements of the Government’s whole 
response to the September 11 attacks, thus of necessity requiring an inquiry 
into sensitive issues of national security.”18  The Court proclaimed that 
“[n]ational-security policy is the prerogative of the Congress and President” 
and that the courts have generally deferred to executive branch 
determinations of essential national security policies.19 
Yet, as the Ziglar Court recognized, all of these talismanic invocations of 
national security policy to defeat federal court jurisdiction were rejected in 
Boumediene and other War on Terror cases challenging the Bush 
administration’s policies with respect to alleged enemy combatants detained 
at Guantanamo.20  The Ziglar Court nonetheless dismissed the judicial role 
in resolving tensions between security and liberty in times of crisis through 
damages actions, holding that “‘congressionally uninvited intrusion’ is 
‘inappropriate.’”21 
 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1869. 
 17. Id. at 1860. 
 18. Id. at 1860–61. 
 19. Id. at 1861. 
 20. Id. at 1861–62. 
 21. Id. at 1862 (quoting United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987)). 
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Ziglar disregards the fact that the Court in Boumediene was far more 
intrusive than simply engaging in “congressionally uninvited intrusion.”22  
Justice Kennedy’s Boumediene decision struck down—for the first time in 
American history—a congressional statute on an issue related to an ongoing 
armed conflict,23 one that had affirmatively and explicitly stripped the federal 
courts of their authority to entertain habeas petitions filed by detainees held 
as alleged enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay.24  That decision represents 
a far more intrusive assertion of judicial review than entertaining a damages 
action in the face of congressional silence. 
Justice Kennedy also suggested that the difference between the two cases 
lies in the heightened separation of powers concerns posed by damages 
actions.25  To Kennedy, the separation of powers concerns inherent in 
national security cases 
are even more pronounced when the judicial inquiry comes in the context 
of a claim seeking money damages rather than a claim seeking injunctive 
or other equitable relief.  The risk of personal damages liability is more 
likely to cause an official to second-guess difficult but necessary decisions 
concerning national-security policy.26 
Moreover, for Kennedy, “of central importance” was that large-scale 
policy decisions at issue in Ziglar—unlike the individual claims of 
discrimination or law enforcement overreach involved in Bivens—could be 
remediable by actions for injunctive relief or possibly habeas relief, which 
“would have provided a faster and more direct route to relief than a suit for 
money damages.”27  Kennedy returns to the refrain that such injunctive 
actions are preferable to money damages because “high officers who face 
personal liability for damages might refrain from taking urgent and lawful 
action in a time of crisis.”28 
Justice Kennedy’s distinction between damages and injunctive remedies is 
supported by some commentators.  For example, Professor Andrew Kent has 
noted the disconnect between appellate court decisions even prior to Ziglar; 
these courts disfavor Bivens actions in national security matters and the 
Supreme Court’s assertive role in high-profile War on Terror cases.29  Kent 
argues that the Court is properly reluctant to allow a damages remedy against 
federal officials in national security cases and instead prefers a system-wide 
 
 22. Id. (quoting Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683). 
 23. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 826–27 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting); David D. 
Cole, Rights over Borders:  Transnational Constitutionalism and Guantanamo Bay, 2008 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47, 47–48. 
 24. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-4, Back Detainee Appeals for Guantánamo, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 13, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/13/washington/13scotus.html 
[https://perma.cc/VHG5-RTVC]. 
 25. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1861. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1862–63. 
 28. Id. at 1863. 
 29. See generally Andrew Kent, Are Damages Different?:  Bivens and National Security, 
87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1123 (2014). 
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injunctive relief through the issuance of what he terms “law declarations” 
rather than providing individual redress.30 
However, the Court and Kent’s assertion that the preference of injunctive 
relief over damages explains the apparent contradiction between Boumediene 
and Ziglar is problematic.  First, as Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent, our 
history demonstrates that an injunctive action brought during the height of a 
war or crisis often presents the most difficult timing for judicial 
intervention.31  Such injunctive actions will inevitably be affected by the 
emotions occasioned by the crisis.32  The information needed for a court to 
decide the constitutional issue will usually be shrouded in secrecy, and the 
executive will strongly argue that such information cannot be publicly 
disclosed.  Moreover, the court will be asked to directly interfere with a 
government policy that is claimed to be necessary to defend the country.  One 
only has to consider what the judicial reaction would have been if the Ziglar 
plaintiffs had sought judicial relief in the immediate aftermath of September 
11 (when their lack of any relationship to terrorists had not been established, 
as it later was) to recognize that a damages action adjudicated years later 
would provide a more propitious opportunity for the considered and 
dispassionate judicial review of the facts and legality of federal officials’ 
actions. 
Second, the Court’s rulings on damages actions have established numerous 
safeguards to ensure that plaintiffs can only prevail in cases presenting the 
clearest and worst constitutional violations.33  For one, qualified immunity 
protects officials unless they have violated a constitutional right that is 
“clearly established.”34  In addition, courts have dismissed some Bivens 
claims based on the state-secrets doctrine, which precludes sensitive national 
security information from being disclosed.35  Furthermore, the “plausible” 
pleading requirement of Ashcroft v. Iqbal36 requires the dismissal of a 
complaint that contains only “conclusory” allegations.37  All of these 
judicially constructed doctrines provide considerable protection for federal 
officials in a national security context.  Justice Kennedy’s concern that 
allowing damages actions may cause future officials to refrain from taking 
“urgent and lawful actions in a time of crisis”38 would therefore only impact 
an official’s decision to refrain from taking actions that are clearly unlawful.  
His rationale therefore seems illogical:  Why would damages suits 
 
 30. Id. at 1158 n.149. 
 31. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1884; see also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE:  
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 218–25 (1998).  See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214 (1944). 
 32. See RANDY E. BARNETT & JOSH BLACKMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE:  CASES IN 
CONTEXT 626 (2d ed. 2018) (stating that “[c]omplaints seeking [injunctive remedies or writs 
of habeas corpus] relief typically come during the emergency itself, when emotions are 
strong”). 
 33. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1884 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 34. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 35. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 311–13 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 36. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 37. Id. at 678. 
 38. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1863 (majority opinion). 
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challenging actions that were clearly unlawful restrain future officials from 
taking urgent, and even plausibly lawful, actions in times of crisis?  
Moreover, shouldn’t we want some constraints placed on federal and state 
officials, instead of allowing them to make these decisions free from 
individual accountability for their actions?  The qualified immunity defense 
is, of course, unavailable in an injunctive action where the Court would be 
forced to decide the constitutional issue presented.39 
Third, as already noted, the injunctive/damage dichotomy used to explain 
the contrasting results in Boumediene and Ziglar has a perverse logic.  
Normally, the Court is more deferential to national security determinations 
where Congress and the President are acting jointly, or as Justice Jackson 
said in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,40 where executive 
emergency power is at its strongest.41  Yet, Boumediene held unconstitutional 
a presidential policy—explicitly supported by congressional statute—to deny 
the Court habeas jurisdiction to review Guantanamo detentions,42 whereas 
Ziglar refused to determine whether a purely executive policy was 
unconstitutional because Congress was silent and had not affirmatively 
provided for a cause of action.43  Moreover, the judicial intervention in 
Boumediene was in tension with and had to distinguish precedent that 
appeared to support the denial of habeas jurisdiction to enemy aliens in 
wartime and had led the lower courts to unanimously decide against the 
plaintiffs.44  In Ziglar, the past precedent of Bivens and Carlson v. Green45 
appeared to support the plaintiffs’ claim as a divided en banc circuit court 
had so found, which forced the majority to argue that the case presented a 
“new context.”46 
Fourth, Professor Kent’s view that the Court has preferred its “law-
declaring”47 role to that of adjudicating individual disputes is inconsistent 
with the Court’s restriction of injunctive remedies through the use of standing 
doctrine,48 which has increasingly been narrowed to preclude law-declaring 
instead of the Court’s traditional role of resolving individual rights claims 
where there has been discrete, nongeneralized harm.49  Moreover, had the 
Court wished to prefer law-declaring over resolving individual disputes, it 
would have left untouched the qualified immunity doctrine, which favors 
judicial resolution of constitutional questions even where the ultimate 
decision is that a constitutional doctrine is not “clearly established.”50  Thus, 
 
 39. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819–20. 
 40. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 41. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 42. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 794–98 (2008). 
 43. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1869. 
 44. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 761–64 (distinguishing United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)). 
 45. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 46. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1859–60. 
 47. Kent, supra note 29, at 1155. 
 48. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111–13 (1983). 
 49. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192–93 (1974) (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
 50. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
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the tension between Boumediene and Ziglar cannot be explained simply by 
the Court’s preference for injunctive law-declaring relief over the resolution 
of individual damages actions. 
Finally, of “central importance” to Justice Kennedy’s Ziglar opinion was 
the theoretical availability of injunctive relief and the possibility of habeas 
remedy for plaintiffs in Abbasi’s situation.51  As various commentators have 
noted, it is unclear whether habeas is even theoretically available to a detainee 
in Abbasi’s position who seeks to challenge his conditions of confinement.52  
That the plaintiffs in Ziglar were held incommunicado and practically had no 
way to challenge the conditions of their detention made either a habeas 
petition or a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief difficult, if not impossible, to 
bring.53  Indeed, in torture cases, the prisoner will generally either be held 
incommunicado or the torture will not continue for the lengthy time needed 
to bring a lawsuit, thereby normally rendering the injunctive relief route 
unavailable.54  It is no accident that of the various cases challenging alleged 
torture by U.S. officials under the Bush administration, none were brought 
while the torture was still ongoing, and thus injunctive relief was unavailable. 
Yet, there is one scenario that would test the Ziglar majority’s insistence 
that injunctive relief as an alternative remedy was really of “central 
importance” to its decision.55  What if U.S. officials affirmatively obstructed 
a detainee from seeking injunctive relief to prevent his torture by lying to his 
attorneys and taking other measures which deliberately barred his access to 
court?  Surely such deliberate denial of a detainee’s ability to seek injunctive 
relief for torture ought to yield the result that no alternative remedy is 
available, and Ziglar’s reasoning should lead to the recognition of a Bivens 
claim in that specific situation. 
Unfortunately, a Bivens remedy for a violation that implicates national 
security does not appear available even in that situation, belying the claim 
 
 51. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1862. 
 52. Vladeck, supra note 7 (noting that the federal circuit courts are split on whether 
plaintiffs may use habeas petitions to challenge their conditions of confinement). 
 53. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1879 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 54. There are, however, some cases in which it is possible to bring a habeas petition fairly 
soon after the detention, as the recent ACLU action challenging a U.S. citizen’s detention in 
Iraq or the Center for Constitutional Rights original habeas petition in Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. 
Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), illustrate. See Charlie Savage, American Detained by Military 
Wants a Lawyer, Government Acknowledges, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/us/politics/american-citizen-detained-isis-hearing.html 
[https://perma.cc/N2TF-XPXA]; Doe v. Mattis—Challenge to Detention of American by U.S. 
Military Abroad, ACLU (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/cases/doe-v-mattis-challenge-
detention-american-us-military-abroad?redirect=cases/aclu-foundation-v-mattis 
[https://perma.cc/ZZJ2-5FTX] (discussing a habeas petition, filed approximately three weeks 
after detention appears to have begun, on behalf of an unidentified American citizen detained 
in Iraq after being allegedly captured in Syria fighting alongside the Islamic State); see also 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (No. 1:02-cv-00299-CKK).  In 
Rasul v. Bush, the habeas petitions were filed in February 2002, approximately one month 
after the first detainees were brought to Guantanamo. See id.; Rasul v. Bush:  Historic Case, 
CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (July 3, 2014), https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/rasul-
v-bush [https://perma.cc/D3PD-EC3P] (detailing timeline of action). 
 55. See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1862. 
2156 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
that the availability of alternative injunctive or habeas relief is of critical 
importance.  That exact scenario had been litigated in Arar v. Ashcroft,56 
where a divided en banc Second Circuit held, in an opinion foreshadowing 
the Supreme Court’s Ziglar decision, that Mr. Arar did not have a Bivens 
claim for damages under federal law.57  The Supreme Court denied Arar’s 
petition for certiorari.58 
II.  ARAR V. ASHCROFT AND THE UNAVAILABILITY 
OF INJUNCTIVE OR HABEAS RELIEF 
Arar v. Ashcroft suggests that the Ziglar Court’s focus on the availability 
of injunctive relief is not of central importance to the dismissal of the Bivens 
claims.  In Arar, government officials were alleged to have deliberately 
blocked Arar from pursuing the injunctive remedy explicitly provided by 
Congress, yet the court nonetheless held that he had no Bivens claim for 
damages.59 
Maher Arar, a dual citizen of Canada and Syria, resided in Ottawa, Canada 
with his wife and children.60  In September 2002, Arar was on vacation with 
his family in Tunisia when he was asked to return to work in Canada by his 
employer, a Massachusetts-based developer and supplier of computing 
software.61  Arar purchased a plane ticket back to Canada with a stop at John 
F. Kennedy International Airport in New York.62 
When Arar arrived at the airport in New York, immigration officials 
prevented him from boarding his connecting flight to Canada.63  The officials 
erroneously suspected that Arar might be associated with a terrorist group.64  
Federal officials detained Arar for the next thirteen days, first at Kennedy 
Airport and then at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New 
York.65  He was placed in solitary confinement, denied any food for almost 
two days, and repeatedly subjected to harsh and lengthy interrogations by 
federal agents concerning his alleged contacts with terrorist groups.66  Arar 
categorically denied any such contacts.67 
Despite Arar’s denials of any association with terrorist groups, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Regional Director Scott 
Blackman determined that Arar was “clearly and unequivocally” a member 
of Al Qaeda, and ordered that he be removed not to Canada, but to Syria.68  
 
 56. 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 57. Id. at 581–82. 
 58. Arar v. Ashcroft, 560 U.S. 978 (2010) (No. 09-923). 
 59. Arar, 585 F.3d. at 580–81. 
 60. Id. at 584. (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  For convenience, this 
Article cites to the facts alleged in Arar’s complaint as set forth by Judge Sack. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 584–85, 595. 
 66. Id. at 585. 
 67. Id. at 584–85. 
 68. Id. at 586. 
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Arar repeatedly and strenuously objected to his removal to Syria, stating that 
it was well known that he would be tortured if sent there.69  While State 
Department reports at the time consistently found credible evidence that 
Syria’s security forces frequently tortured prisoners in custody, Blackman 
determined that Arar’s removal to Syria was consistent with the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture (the “CAT”),70 which prohibits the 
removal of an alien to a country where he or she faces a substantial risk of 
torture.71  Arar was sent to New Jersey, where he was placed on a small plane 
and flown to Jordan.72  Jordanian authorities delivered him to Syria that same 
day.73 
In Syria, Arar was placed in a “grave” cell measuring six feet long, seven 
feet high, and three feet wide.74  The cell was damp, cold, and rat infested.75  
Arar was only allowed to bathe once a week with cold water, was “prohibited 
from exercising[,] and was provided barely edible food.”76  He lost forty 
pounds during his ten-month detention in Syria.77  For the first period in 
Syrian detention, he was brutally, physically, and psychologically tortured.78  
He was interrogated by the Syrians for eighteen hours per day and asked 
strikingly similar questions to those that U.S. officials had asked him in New 
York.79  Eventually, after almost a year, Arar was released by the Syrians 
without any charges and flown by Canadian officials back to Ottawa.80 
Arar’s complaint alleged that U.S. officials deliberately conspired with the 
Syrians to intentionally send him from the United States to Syria for the 
purpose of being tortured.81  At the time, the Bush administration had a policy 
of “extraordinary rendition,” by which suspected terrorists were transferred 
to countries that engaged in torture so that these countries could obtain 
information about terrorism from them using methods that would be illegal 
in the United States.82  Arar alleged that he was subjected to this policy.83  
There is no other plausible reason that U.S. officials would send a Canadian 
citizen who they suspected was a terrorist not to Canada—an ally in the fight 
against terrorism—but instead to Syria, except that high-level U.S. officials 
believed that Syria could get information from him using methods that 
 
 69. Id. at 585–86. 
 70. G.A. Res. 39/46 (III), ¶ 1 (Dec. 10, 1984) (“No State Party shall expel, return 
(‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”). 
 71. Arar, 585 F.3d. at 586. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 586–87. 
 76. Id. at 587. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  Arar alleged that those officials had sent the Syrians a dossier of questions to ask. 
Id. 
 80. Id. at 587–88. 
 81. Id. at 588. 
 82. See id.; see also Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless:  Extraordinary 
Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1335–50 (2007). 
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neither the United States nor Canada could legally use.84  As Judge 
Barrington Parker’s dissenting opinion in the Second Circuit summarized: 
Maher Arar credibly alleges that United States officials conspired to ship 
him from American soil, where the Constitution and our laws apply, to 
Syria, where they do not, so that Syrian agents could torture him at federal 
officials’ direction and behest.85 
Judge Parker and his dissenting colleagues also found that Arar “credibly 
alleges that, to accomplish this unlawful objective, agents of our government 
actively obstructed his access to this very Court and the protections 
established by Congress.”86  After his initial detention, federal officials 
denied Arar’s repeated requests for counsel and to make a phone call.87  His 
family, upon finding out about his detention, retained an attorney to represent 
him and Arar finally met with his lawyer ten days after he was detained.88  
The very next day—a Sunday—federal officials hastily scheduled an 
interrogation of Arar at 9:00 p.m., ostensibly to determine whether he had a 
legitimate fear of torture if sent to Syria.89  The officials provided no 
meaningful advance notice to Arar’s attorney of that meeting, leaving a 
voicemail on her office phone earlier that day.90  Moreover, Arar alleged that 
the officials had falsely told him that his lawyer had chosen not to 
participate.91 
The next day, Arar’s lawyer had two phone calls with INS officers who 
falsely informed her that Arar had been taken for processing to an INS office 
in Manhattan and that he would eventually be placed in a detention facility 
in New Jersey.92  In fact, Arar remained in New York that day, was taken out 
of his cell at 4:00 a.m. the next morning, and 
served with his “Final Notice of Inadmissibility,” a prerequisite to a petition 
for review in federal court, and secretly transported out of the country [to 
Jordan and then to Syria].  Defendants never served the order on Arar’s 
lawyer, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(a) (2002), and never informed her 
that Arar had been removed to Syria.93 
In implementing treaty obligations under the CAT, Congress provided a 
means for a person in Arar’s situation to petition a court of appeals to gain 
relief from a removal from the United States to a country where there would 
be a significant fear that he or she would be tortured.94  But the Arar 
defendants affirmatively colluded to prevent Arar from exercising his 
statutory right to seek injunctive relief by (1) denying his access to counsel, 
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(2) lying to him and his counsel, and (3) only providing him with the requisite 
notice hours before he was secretly transferred out of the country.95  If the 
Supreme Court was really serious about its pronouncement that a Bivens 
remedy is unnecessary when there is some alternative forum to obtain 
injunctive or habeas relief,96 Arar should have been provided with the vehicle 
to demonstrate that point.  Judge Parker, who wrote separately and was joined 
by three dissenting colleagues, noted that “[i]f the Constitution ever implied 
a damages remedy, this is such a case—where executive officials allegedly 
blocked access to the remedies chosen by Congress in order to deliver a man 
to known torturers.”97  Indeed, he continued 
to emphasize the heightened need for a Bivens remedy in cases such as this 
where executive officials have deliberately thwarted the remedies provided 
by Congress and obstructed access to the courts.  Arar’s claims in this 
regard supply an exceptionally compelling justification for affording a 
Bivens remedy, going well beyond the allegations that gave rise to Bivens 
in the first place.98 
In the Arar case, the court held that Congress had spoken affirmatively that 
persons facing removal to a country where they might be tortured had a right 
to seek judicial relief to enjoin such a removal.99  Yet, executive officials 
deliberately thwarted Arar’s right to injunctive relief, not simply by holding 
him incommunicado for a period of time but by lying to his lawyer and 
deliberately not giving him notice of removal until it was too late to file a 
petition.100  The rationale of Ziglar strongly suggests that Arar should have 
been entitled to a Bivens claim for damages. 
After losing in the Court of Appeals en banc by a seven-to-four vote, Arar 
sought Supreme Court review.101  The Court denied his petition for a writ of 
certiorari without any comment or dissent.102 
Finally, as a postscript, after Arar’s return to Canada, the Canadian 
government convened a commission chaired by a prominent judge to 
investigate the Arar affair.  In September 2006, the commission issued a 
three-volume report that fully exonerated Arar.103  Commissioner Dennis 
O’Connor importantly concluded, “I am able to say categorically that there 
is no evidence to indicate that Mr. Arar has committed any offence or that his 
activities constitute a threat to the security of Canada.”104  The Canadian 
Parliament unanimously apologized to Arar, as did Canada’s Prime Minister, 
and the Canadian government paid him 10.5 million Canadian dollars for its 
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role in providing false information about him to U.S. officials.105  The 
Canadian government also sent letters to the Syrian and U.S. governments 
formally objecting to Arar’s treatment.106  To date, the U.S. government has 
not apologized to Arar nor formally recognized any wrongdoing on its part 
in his removal to Syria.107 
III.  OFFICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS IN TIME OF CRISIS 
For many commentators and dissenting Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, the 
Ziglar decision’s key deficiency is that it contradicts the basic premise of 
both Bivens and Marbury v. Madison108 that “[t]he very essence of civil 
liberty [lies] in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the 
laws whenever he receives an injury.”109  Yet, as important as the 
overarching maxim that where there is a right there must be some legal 
remedy, the most dangerous aspect of Ziglar is its denial of accountability 
for officials’ actions that violate the Constitution and are taken in response to 
a national emergency or crisis.  The key early opinion that Ziglar contradicts 
in that respect is not Marbury but Little v. Barreme,110 which was decided by 
a unanimous Court one year after the former.  Moreover, Ziglar is 
inconsistent with the constitutional theory of accountability in times of 
national emergency held by not only the early courts but also important 
political leaders of the founding generation.111 
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The predominant constitutional thought of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries sought to resolve the inherent tension between the rule 
of law and the necessity of the government to exercise emergency powers 
during national crises by preserving a boundary between normal 
constitutional order and the ominous world of crisis government.112  
Emergency and the normal constitutional order were counterposed.113   
Normalcy permitted a governmental structure based on separation of 
powers, respect for civil liberties and the rule of law, while emergencies 
required strong executive rule, premised not on law and respect for civil 
liberties, but rather on [executive] discretion to take a wide range of actions 
to preserve the government.114 
As Oliver Cromwell pithily stated before Parliament, “Necessity hath no 
law.”115 
The framers as well as nineteenth-century political leaders thus feared 
emergency action and saw in foreign crisis the loss of liberty.116  As William 
Pitt put it in 1783, “Necessity [is] the plea for every infringement of human 
freedom.”117  The framers’ failure to provide for any general emergency rule 
or martial law, apart from permitting the federal government to call out the 
militia to suppress insurrections and suspend the writ of habeas corpus, 
undoubtedly reflects their unwillingness to allow the federal government to 
suspend constitutional rights or the rule of law in times of great necessity.118 
Nonetheless, early leaders recognized that there were times that 
government leaders would need to take actions that were not in accordance 
with constitutional principles.119  Their solution was to permit political or 
military leaders who believed that a crisis required emergency action to act 
unlawfully, extraconstitutionally, or even unconstitutionally, but, if they took 
such action, to require them to openly acknowledge the potential 
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unlawfulness of that action and to be willing to risk the possibility that 
Congress and the courts might not ratify it.120  The founding generation thus 
attempted to create a strict boundary between constitutional, nonemergency 
acts, and unconstitutional acts taken during times of emergency and necessity 
but nonetheless unjustified by the law.121 
For example, President Thomas Jefferson believed that the Constitution 
carefully limited executive emergency power but that a President should 
nevertheless act unlawfully when a great pubic necessity required it and 
openly acknowledge the illegality and risk public sanction or approval as a 
consequence.122  This Jeffersonian dichotomy was illustrated when Jefferson, 
confronting the Burr conspiracy123 in 1807, argued that “[o]n great 
occasions . . . every good officer must be ready to risk himself in going 
beyond the strict line of the law, when the public preservation requires it; his 
motives will be a justification.”124 
After leaving the presidency, Jefferson was asked whether there are “not 
periods when, in free governments, it is necessary for officers in responsible 
stations to exercise an authority beyond the law.”125  Jefferson responded: 
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties 
of a good citizen, but it is not the highest.  The laws of necessity, of self-
preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher 
obligation. 
. . . . 
The officer who is called to act on this superior ground, does indeed risk 
himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the [C]onstitution, and 
his station makes it his duty to incur that risk. 
. . . . 
The line of discrimination between cases may be difficult; but the good 
officer is bound to draw it at his own peril, and throw himself on the justice 
of his country and the rectitude of his motives.126 
The role of the courts under this theoretical framework is therefore to 
determine in individual cases whether executive officials have exceeded their 
constitutional powers in wartime or national emergencies and to assess fines 
or damages, which Congress may later indemnify.  The Supreme Court’s 
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decision in Barreme is the best example of Jefferson’s principle applied in 
judicial practice.127 
In Barreme, a unanimous Court upheld the imposition of individual 
liability on a naval commander for his violation of a congressional statute 
during wartime, even though he had acted pursuant to a presidential order.128  
The statute at issue, enacted during the United States’ 1790s quasi-war with 
France, provided for the seizure of American vessels that were “bound or 
sailing to” French ports.129  The Adams administration, apparently believing 
that the constrictive statute would allow American shipping to evade its 
prohibitions, issued instructions to naval commanders to seize ostensibly 
neutral ships they determined to be American that were “bound to or from 
French ports.”130  Captain Little, believing that The Flying-Fish, a Danish 
vessel, was an American ship traveling from a French port, captured the ship 
and brought it into an American port to be salvaged as a prize of war.131 
Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, sympathized 
with the administration’s instructions to its naval commanders, noting that 
the instructions were designed to avoid evasions of the Act and that they 
provided a “construction [of the statute] much better calculated to give it 
effect.”132  Nonetheless, the instructions violated the express language of the 
Act and were therefore unlawful even though issued by the Commander in 
Chief during a military conflict.133  Captain Little’s seizure of The Flying-
Fish was therefore unlawful even if he had legitimate reason to believe that 
it was an American ship because it was indisputably sailing from, rather than 
to, France.134  The question then became whether to impose individual 
liability for damages on Captain Little.135 
Marshall held that Little must be answerable in damages to the owner of 
the vessel, noting: 
I confess the first bias of my mind was very strong in favour of the opinion 
that though the instructions of the executive could not give a right, they 
might yet excuse from damages.  I was much inclined to think that a 
distinction ought to be taken between acts of civil and those of military 
officers; and between proceedings within the body of the country and those 
on the high seas.  That implicit obedience which military men usually pay 
to the orders of their superiors, which indeed is indispensably necessary to 
every military system, appeared to me strongly to imply the principle that 
those orders, if not to perform a prohibited act, ought to justify the person 
whose general duty it is to obey them, and who is placed by the laws of his 
country in a situation which in general requires that he should obey them.  
I was strongly inclined to think that where, in consequence of orders from 
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the legitimate authority, a vessel is seized with pure intention, the claim of 
the injured party for damages would be against that government from which 
the orders proceeded, and would be a proper subject for negotiation.  But I 
have been convinced that I was mistaken, and I have receded from this first 
opinion.  I acquiesce in that of my brethren, which is that the instructions 
cannot change the nature of the transaction or legalize an act which without 
those instructions would have been a plain trespass.136 
Barreme was not a unique case; in numerous other cases the Court held 
military commanders or other federal officers liable in damages for unlawful 
seizures or trespasses.137  For example, in The Apollon,138 Justice Joseph 
Story, writing for a unanimous Court, assessed damages against an official 
of the seizure of a ship and cargo motivated by perceived necessity: 
It may be fit and proper for the government, in the exercise of the high 
discretion confided to the executive, for great public purposes, to act on a 
sudden emergency, or to prevent an irreparable mischief, by summary 
measures, which are not found in the text of the laws.  Such measures are 
properly matters of state, and if the responsibility is taken, under justifiable 
circumstances, the Legislature will doubtless apply a proper indemnity.  
But this Court can only look to the questions, whether the laws have been 
violated; and if they were, justice demands, that the injured party should 
receive a suitable redress.139 
Similarly, in Mitchell v. Harmony140 the Supreme Court upheld a damages 
award against a commander for the improper seizure of property during the 
Mexican War, ruling that the jury had properly determined that an emergency 
did not exist at the time of the officer’s actions, even though the officer 
believed such an emergency existed.141 
The most politically prominent judicial application of Jefferson’s theory 
of emergency power came in the aftermath of General Andrew Jackson’s 
victory in 1815 over the British during the War of 1812 at New Orleans.  
When Jackson’s activities under martial law were challenged in a federal 
contempt proceeding, he justified his actions by citing Jefferson’s view that 
necessity “may in some cases . . . justify a departure from the 
[C]onstitution.”142  President Madison, relieved that Jackson based his 
defense on necessity, observed that even though a suspension of liberties 
“may be justified by the law of necessity,” a commander “cannot resort to the 
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established law of the land, for the means of vindication.”143  The federal 
court held Jackson’s actions to be unlawful and fined him $1000.144 
In many of these cases, Congress eventually indemnified the officials who 
had been required to pay damages for their unlawful actions.145  For example, 
Congress indemnified Captain Little several years after the Court’s decision 
because his unlawful actions had aided the nation during wartime.146  
Congress also indemnified Captain Murray for the damages he was forced to 
pay as a result of his unlawful seizure of the schooner Exchange during the 
quasi-war with France.147  Finally, almost thirty years after Jackson was fined 
for contempt, Congress enacted legislation to repay Jackson the principal and 
interest on the fine.148 
CONCLUSION 
Barreme and other similar cases from the early period of the Republic 
demonstrate that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ziglar is at odds with the basic 
precepts of the framers’ view of the judicial role in addressing official claims 
of necessity during serious crises.149  The Ziglar Court’s position that 
qualified immunity was insufficient to protect federal officials from actions 
they take in times of crisis cannot be reconciled with the framers’ view of the 
doctrine.150  Further, permitting any risk that an official might face from a 
damages action—even for violating rights clearly established by the 
Constitution—would cause officials to unacceptably second-guess and 
possibly avoid taking difficult but arguably necessary actions to protect 
national security.  This, too, is simply inconsistent with the views of Justice 
Marshall, Justice Story, and their brethren at the country’s founding.151 
In fact, Jefferson and Madison’s perspective was the exact opposite of 
Kennedy’s:  they believed that if officials took potentially unconstitutional 
action in the face of a grave emergency, they should only do so with the 
recognition that they might face a damages action or other serious 
consequences for unlawful conduct unless Congress either indemnifies or 
ratifies their action.152  For it is the recognition of that risk that provides some 
accountability and caution on the part of political leaders in taking 
unconstitutional actions.  Jefferson’s perspective does not merely focus on 
the individual’s right to a remedy but on ensuring that, when political or 
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military commanders violate the law in taking actions that they believe 
necessity demands, such decisions are only made with the check that a legal 
violation brings with it personal risk and peril.153 
Unfortunately, the abdication of postaction accountability for emergency 
decisions extends beyond the judiciary.  One of the Obama administration’s 
first actions upon taking office was to prohibit the future use of torture, 
including measures such as waterboarding.154  Nonetheless, the Obama 
administration refused to criminally prosecute federal agents who, following 
Bush administration policy, used such methods in the interrogation of terror 
suspects.155  Moreover, the Obama administration consistently argued in 
federal court that officials who committed such actions could not be held 
accountable, even in a damages action in federal court.156  The Obama 
administration, as well as the courts, thus refused to demand accountability 
for these abuses, arguing that changing the rule for the future negated the 
need for looking backward to address prior misconduct.  The problem with 
this argument is that one of the most powerful means of ensuring future 
adherence to the constitutional and legal rule prohibiting torture is to ensure 
that officials who consider violating that norm under the guise of emergency 
clearly understand that they are taking a personal risk in doing so. 
It is the judiciary’s role under checks and balances—and not simply its 
ability to provide a remedy for the violation of a right—that provides the most 
compelling reason that Ziglar is wrong.  For it is the assurance that future 
officials will address emergencies with a recognition that they face personal 
risks for violating the law, and not—as Nixon once famously said—that 
presidential national security orders are per se constitutional,157 that will 
make our country and Constitution safer. 
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